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Abstract 
People are motivated to establish and maintain a positive self-image. When 
people fail to attain their goals self-esteem is threatened, and this elicits the 
motivation to protect or repair self-esteem. We investigated whether success and 
failure to attain goals affects self-esteem if these goals were unconsciously activated. 
In three experiments, we tested and confirmed the hypothesis that self-esteem is 
indeed affected by success and failure to attain unconsciously activated goals. In two 
additional experiments, we demonstrated that people were motivated to protect or 
restore self-esteem after failure to attain an unconsciously activated achievement goal.  
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We all know that setting a goal does not always lead to successful goal-
pursuit. In the new year we make plans to exercise more, but already in the second 
week of January we skip our intended visit to the gym. Attempts to lose weight or 
attempts to quit smoking very often remain just attempts and the failure to attain such 
goals often results in disappointment or sadness. After having struggled for an entire 
week, smoking a few cigarettes on Friday afternoon will leave a bitter aftertaste, and 
sadness, the next morning. By contrast, succeeding in your goals will often result in 
positive emotions. For example, finding out at the end of a week of dieting that you 
have lost four pounds will cause pride and happiness. 
Success and failure to attain goals not only affects various emotions, it can 
also influence self-esteem. Success in attaining self-relevant goals can increase self-
esteem, whereas failure can decrease self-esteem. Winning a trivia quiz can make you 
feel very intelligent and will thereby heighten self-esteem, whereas a failure to quit 
smoking will make you feel like a weak person lacking willpower. The latter feeling 
will obviously lower self-esteem.  
One question we want to address in the current research is whether success 
and failure to fulfill unconsciously activated goals will affect self-esteem. There is 
considerable evidence showing that goals can be activated and pursued without 
conscious awareness (see Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 1990; Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar & Trötschel, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh 1996; 
Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Moskowitz, 
Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Shah, 2003; Shah, Kruglanski, & Friedman, 
2003). Participants who were surreptitiously primed with an achievement goal 
performed better on a subsequent task than participants not primed with that goal 
(Bargh, et. al., 2001). Moreover, participants who were unobtrusively exposed to 
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citrus-scented all-purpose cleaner kept their table cleaner while eating a snack than 
participants who were not exposed to the cleaner (Holland, Hendriks, & Aarts, 2005). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that the representation of significant others can induce 
goal-directed behavior (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003). Priming participants 
subliminally with their father increases the pursuit of a task goal, especially when 
participants are close to their father and perceive their father as wanting them to do 
well on the task at hand (Shah, 2003).  
Despite a considerable amount of research on the effects of unconsciously 
activated goals on behavior and cognition, little research has examined the effects of 
success and failure to attain unconsciously activated goals (but see, Chartrand, 1999; 
Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003). As already mentioned in 
the opening example of this chapter, goal setting does not always lead to successful 
goal pursuit. Obviously, the same is true for unconsciously activated goals. The 
question we address here is whether unconsciously activated goals also affect self-
esteem, and, related to this first question, whether people also try to protect and/or 
restore self-esteem as a result of failure to attain unconsciously activated goals. We 
start out by exploring the first question.  
Success and failure in unconscious goal-pursuit 
Recently, Chartrand (1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002) started to explore the 
effects of success and failure to attain an unconsciously activated goal on mood. For 
example, after being primed with the goal to achieve or not participants performed 
either a difficult or an easy anagram task. The results showed that participants who 
were primed with the goal to achieve were in a better mood after performing the easy 
anagram task than after the difficult anagram task, whereas for participants who were 
not primed task difficulty did not affect their mood. Chartrand (1999; Chartrand & 
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Bargh, 2002) called the resulting moods “mystery moods”. Participants were, 
depending on conditions, in a good or bad mood without knowing the origins of these 
moods.  
Riketta and Dauenheimer (2003) extended this research by examining the 
effects of anticipated success on mood and self-esteem. Participants were primed 
unconsciously with a goal to acquire knowledge or not and were then told that they 
were to complete a personality test in which they would receive feedback, thereby 
anticipating satisfying their goal to acquire knowledge. However, whereas some 
participants heard this announcement prior to the administration of the mood and self-
esteem measures, other participants received this announcement afterwards. The 
results showed that when the announcement was given before measuring mood and 
self-esteem participants primed with the goal to acquire knowledge were in a better 
mood and reported higher self-esteem than participants not primed with that goal. 
However, when the announcement was given after measuring mood and self-esteem 
no such differences were found.  
These findings show that mood as well as self-esteem can be influenced by 
unconscious goal pursuit. However, one limitation is that the effects Riketta and 
Dauenheimer found were produced by the effects in the control condition rather than 
in the goal condition. In addition, Riketta and Dauenheimer only investigated 
anticipated successful goal pursuit. Their findings do not predict whether actual 
success may also heighten self-esteem. Finally, because Riketta and Dauenheimer 
only investigated successful goal pursuit it is not clear whether failure to attain an 
unconsciously activated goal may impair self-esteem. Hence, the main question we set 
to address - whether actual success and failure to attain an unconsciously activated 
goal may affect self-esteem - is still open. 
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Protecting and restoring self-esteem 
Several studies have shown that self-esteem can be affected by success and 
failure (e.g., Brown & Dutton, 1995; Crocker, Sommers, & Luhtanen, 2002; 
Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Heatherton and Polivy 
(1991), for example, examined the effects of academic failure on self-esteem. They 
showed that students who received a low grade for their midterm exam reported lower 
self-esteem than students who received a high grade for that exam and than students 
who received a mediocre grade. In addition, there is ample of evidence that people try 
to restore their self-esteem if self-esteem is threatened. People are motivated to 
establish and maintain a positive self-image (e.g. Covington, 1998, 2000; Steele, 
1988, Tesser, 1988; Thompson, 1993, 1994).  
People use many different strategies to repair their self-esteem after failure. 
One such strategy is to make self-serving attributions after failure. People tend to 
attribute failure more to external causes than to internal causes (e.g., Campbell & 
Sedikides, 1999; Zuckerman, 1979) and more to unstable causes than to stable causes 
(e.g., Feather, 1987; Menapace & Doby, 1976). For example, when you perform 
poorly on an exam, you can protect your self-esteem by arguing that the exam was 
ridiculously difficult and that it was too noisy in the room. 
Another strategy people use to restore self-esteem is self-affirmation (Liu & 
Steele, 1986; Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983). People reevaluate or reinterpret 
experiences and events in ways that reaffirm the self’s integrity and value. For 
example, when you performed poorly in a certain domain, you may argue that the 
domain is unimportant. 
Finally, another strategy to protect self-esteem after failure is to engage in 
(downward) social comparisons (e.g., Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988; Wills, 1981; 
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Wood, 1989). After failure, people tend to compare themselves with others who are 
“worse off” relative to themselves. However, you are not always in a position to 
choose someone to compare yourself with and sometimes it is obvious that you 
performed worse than other people. Dunning and colleagues (Beauregard & Dunning, 
1998; Dunning & Cohen, 1992) argued that people can be very creative in protecting 
self-esteem when confronted with people who are “better off”. Dunning and Cohen 
(1992), for example, showed that after a poor performance participants rated others’ 
performances as good, regardless of whether this performance was actually poor, 
medium or good. The logic behind rating all performances as good is that participants 
who performed poorly do not need to label their poor performance as such. 
Conversely, after good performance participants rated other performance much more 
realistically (high performing others as high, medium and low performing others as 
low).  
There is some evidence that people use self-protecting mechanisms after 
unconscious goal-pursuit failure. For instance, Chartrand and colleagues (see 
Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; Chartrand, Cheng & Tesser, 2001) showed that people who 
failed to attain unconsciously activated goals construed more self-serving definitions 
of success compared to people without unconsciously activated goals. Chartrand and 
colleagues argued that this form of self-enhancement was the result of the fact that 
participants did not know where their bad mood came from. Indeed, they showed that 
self-enhancement disappeared when participants were able to attribute their mood to 
the completed task by indicating how that task made them feel. We propose, however, 
that threat to the self needs to be involved and we expect that people still use self-
protecting mechanisms after indicating their self-esteem. 
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To recapitulate, the first question we want to address in the current research is 
whether actual success and failure to attain an unconsciously activated goal may 
affect self-esteem. We predict that problematic goal pursuit will lower self-esteem 
compared to successful goal pursuit. A second aim is to address the consequences of 
such effects on self-esteem regulation. As discussed before, a substantial body of 
research has indicated that people are motivated to maintain a positive self-image, 
hence protect their self-esteem when opportunities are given. Therefore, in the current 
research we also examine whether people are motivated and able to protect their self-
esteem after failing to attain an unconsciously activated goal.  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 we investigated whether success and failure to attain an 
unconsciously activated achievement goal will affect mood and self-esteem. To do so, 
we used a similar design as Chartrand (1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002). After being 
primed with an achievement goal or not participants were either given a difficult or an 
easy version of the Raven Progressive Matrices Test (Raven, 1941). Subsequently 
mood and self-esteem were measured. Mood was measured to make it easier to 
compare our findings to the work by Chartrand (1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002) and 
to the work by Riketta and Dauenheimer (2003). However, our most important 
dependent measure constitutes self-esteem. We expected that participants who were 
primed with the goal to achieve would have lower self-esteem after the difficult 
Raven test than after the easy Raven test, whereas no such difference was expected for 
participants not primed with the achievement goal.  
Method 
Participants and Design. 
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Ninety-three (22 men, 71 women) Dutch undergraduate students at the 
University of Amsterdam participated in the experiment, receiving either course 
credits or money (4 euro; approximately US$ 5) for their participation. They were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions in a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) 
x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between participants design.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants worked in separate cubicles and all instructions were provided by 
the computer. Participants started with a scrambled sentences task (Srull & Wyer, 
1980), in which they were primed with the goal to achieve or not. The task consisted 
of 24 sentences with six words in random order. Participants were asked to create 
meaningful Dutch sentences with five of the six words. In the achievement condition 
20 sentences contained words semantically related to the goal to achieve (e.g., to 
achieve; to win; to strive) and in the no goal condition these words were replaced by 
words that were unrelated to the goal to achieve (e.g., to play; to walk; to make). 
After the priming procedure participants were given ten items of the Raven 
Progressive Matrices Test (Raven, 1941). The Raven test presents a series of 
incomplete figures. Participants were asked to judge which of the eight segments 
would accurately complete each figure. Generally, the Raven test is used to measure 
intelligence. Therefore, to prevent all participants from becoming motivated to 
achieve on this test, we introduced it as filler (see also, Chartrand, 1999; Chartrand & 
Bargh, 2002). We expected that introducing this task as a filler would make 
performance in this task less relevant for participants without an unconsciously 
activated achievement goal. However, for primed participants, performance in this test 
was expected to become relevant. The difficulty of the task was manipulated by 
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giving participants either ten very easy items (easy condition) or ten very difficult 
items (difficult condition)1. 
Subsequently, mood and self-esteem were measured. Mood was measured 
with six bipolar items (good-bad; cheerful-sad; contented-discontented; satisfied-
unsatisfied; encouraged-discouraged; happy-unhappy) and participants were asked to 
indicate how they felt at that moment on a 9-point scale. Half of the items were 
reversed to control for response bias. Afterwards, self-esteem was measured with the 
20 items of the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991), which 
could be answered on 9-point Likert scales. Heatherton and Polivy (1991) 
distinguished three types of self-esteem: performance self-esteem, social self-esteem, 
and appearance self-esteem. Performance self-esteem is related to academic abilities; 
social self-esteem is related to social confidence; and appearance self-esteem is 
related to body image.  
We predicted that success and failure to attain an achievement goal would 
predominantly influence performance self-esteem. Because the statements used to 
measure social self-esteem are somewhat related to success and failure (e.g., “I am 
worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.” and “I feel inferior to 
others at this moment.”), we reasoned that our manipulation may affect social self-
esteem as well. Finally, succeeding or failing to attain an achievement goal was not 
expected to influence appearance self-esteem.  
Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed. Funneled debriefing indicated 
that none of the participants was aware of the purpose of the experiment and none of 
the participants noticed a particular pattern or theme to the words in the scrambled 
sentences task. However, three participants were excluded from the analyses because 
they did not take the Raven test seriously (they used less than 6 seconds per item). 
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Results 
Performance  
Participants’ total number of correct items in the Raven test was subjected to a 
2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis confirmed that participants in the easy 
conditions performed better than participants in the difficult conditions (M = 8.31, SD 
= 1.68 and M = 3.00, SD = 2.11, respectively), F(1,86) = 170.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .66. 
No effects of goal emerged, both F’s < 0.1. 
 Mood 
The item scores of the mood scale (α = .92) were averaged and subjected to a 
2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis revealed a significant main effect of task 
F(1,86) = 12.93, p = .001, η2 = .13, indicating that participants who accomplished the 
easy Raven test were in a better mood than participants who accomplished the 
difficult Raven test (M = 6.75, SD = 1.23 and M = 5.80, SD = 1.27, respectively). The 
two-way interaction of goal and task failed to reach significance, F(1,86) = 2.29, ns. 
Self-esteem  
Preliminary analyses showed that, as expected, performance self-esteem and 
social self-esteem were affected by our manipulation, whereas appearance self-esteem 
was not. We obtained this pattern in all studies, and all analyses on the SSES were 
done on a combination of performance self-esteem and social self-esteem.  
The item scores of the SSES (α = .87) were subjected to a 2 (goal: 
achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). The analysis revealed a main effect of task, F(1,86) = 9.28, p < 
.005, ηp2 = .10, indicating that participants reported higher self-esteem after the easy 
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Raven test than after the difficult Raven test, see Table 1. As expected, this main 
effect was qualified by the two-way interaction between goal and task, F(1,86) = 7.27, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .08. Analyses of simple main effects indicated that for participants 
primed with an achievement goal, those who accomplished the easy Raven test 
reported higher self-esteem than those who accomplished the difficult Raven test, 
F(1,87) = 16.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. We did not find a difference for participants not 
primed with the goal to achieve, F(1,87) = 0.06, ns. 
We also analyzed the effects on self-esteem controlling for differences in 
mood. Scores of the self-esteem scale were subjected to a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no 
goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with mood as a covariate. This analysis revealed that the effects on self-esteem were 
still significant after controlling for differences in mood, F(1,85) = 4.87, p < .05, η2 = 
.05. Therefore, we can conclude that the manipulation did affect self-esteem and that 
this is at least partly independent of a more general emotional reaction.  
The results of Experiment 1 showed that participants primed with an 
achievement goal reported higher self-esteem after an easy task than after a difficult 
task, whereas no such differences were found for participants not primed with an 
achievement goal. However, we did not replicate the two-way interaction of goal and 
task on mood that was reported by Chartrand (1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002). It 
may be the case that participants perceived the Raven test we used in this experiment 
as more diagnostic for academic performance than the tasks used by Chartrand, and 
hence, that participants’ mood was influenced by the performance on that task 
regardless of goal-activation. After all, performing well on an academic test may 
improve your mood simply because it feels good to do well, and this effect may occur 
irrespective of an achievement goal. The opposite may have been true for participants 
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who performed poorly. Performing poorly on an academic test does not feel good and 
results in a worse mood. Moreover, one big difference between Chartrand’s 
instructions and ours is that she told participants that the data would not be collected. 
Although we did introduce this task as a filler task like Chartrand did, we did not tell 
our participants that the data would not be collected. So despite of introducing the task 
as a filler task, perhaps our participants may have seen the task as at least somewhat 
relevant or important. We assume that as long as the task is at least relevant, success 
or failure may instigate effects on mood, irrespective of the goal one is pursuing.  
In contrast with previous research (e.g. Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, 
Barndollar & Trötschel, 2001), we did not find any differences as a function of goal 
prime. However, the difficulty of the goal task in previous research has never been 
manipulated and when manipulated performance on that task was not reported. One 
possibility for the lack of finding differences is that actual performance on a very easy 
or very difficult goal task is not the best way to measure differences in motivation. 
For example, if you do not know the answer on a very difficult question, the 
motivation to answer the question correctly will not necessarily result in giving the 
right answer. If it was, then all motivated students would always pass a difficult exam. 
Most likely, motivation to perform well will reflect in the time you use to find a good 
solution. Therefore, we think that actual performance on a very easy or very difficult 
task will be too insensitive to find motivational differences. 
Experiment 2 
The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate the effects of successful 
and problematic goal-pursuit on self-esteem with a subliminal priming procedure. 
Furthermore, we used a different task difficulty manipulation to examine the effects of 
goal-pursuit success and failure on mood and self-esteem. In Experiment 2 
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participants were subliminally primed with words related to the goal to achieve or 
with neutral words in a lexical decision task. After the priming procedure, participants 
were given either a difficult or an easy “scrabble” task. Subsequently, mood and self-
esteem were administered.  
Method 
Participants and Design. 
Seventy (21 men, 49 women) Dutch undergraduate students at the University 
of Amsterdam participated in the experiment, receiving either course credits or money 
(4 euro; approximately US$ 5) for their participation. They were randomly assigned to 
one of the four conditions in a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. 
difficult) between participants design.  
Procedure and Materials 
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were allocated to separate cubicles 
and all instructions were provided by the computer. The first task was announced as a 
“language task”. It was a lexical decision task in which participants were subliminally 
primed with words related to the goal to achieve (e.g., to win and to attain) or with 
neutral words (e.g., to use and to drag). These words were flashed on the screen for 17 
milliseconds. A forward mask (a row of X’s) preceded each word for 250 
milliseconds and a backward mask (again a row of X’s) followed each word for 33 
milliseconds. Immediately after the backward mask a word was presented on the 
screen. Participants were asked to indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible 
whether the word on the screen was an existing Dutch word or not by pressing 
respectively the ‘c’ or the ‘m’ on the computer keyboard. Nine words were existing 
Dutch words and nine words were nonsense words, making a total of 18 trials. 
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The second task was a scrabble task (see Chartrand, 1999)2. This task was 
announced as a “pilot study for language use”. We named it a pilot study to make the 
task less relevant. Participants were given eight letters and they were asked to create 
as many Dutch words as possible within 6 minutes. Two restrictions were given: The 
letters could be used only once per word and the created words should contain at least 
three letters. Participants were asked to type words on the computer keyboard. The 
difficulty of the task was manipulated by giving participants in the easy conditions 
eight letters that are very common in Dutch language (k, a, e, l, r, o n, t) and 
participants in the difficult conditions eight letters that were not very common in 
Dutch language (p, u, v, z, o, k, h, i). We did not expect any differences as a function 
of goal prime on performance. For participants in the easy condition it should be very 
easy to create a lot of existing Dutch words, whereas for participants in the difficult 
condition it should be very difficult to create existing Dutch words. After 6 minutes, 
the computer program automatically continued. 
After the scrabble task, the mood scale (the same as in Experiment 1) and the 
SSES were administered. In this experiment mood was measured on a 17-point scale 
(-8 to +8) and state self-esteem was measured on 5-point Likert scales. 
Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed. Funneled debriefing indicated 
that none of the participants saw something unusual or notice any flashes during the 
lexical decision task and none of the participants was aware of the relationship among 
different parts of the experiment. 
Results 
Performance  
It was confirmed that participants in the easy conditions created more Dutch 
words in the scrabble task than participants in the difficult conditions (M = 26.97, SD 
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= 12.70 and M = 12.14, SD = 5.18, respectively), F(1,66) = 40.93, p < .001, η2 = .38. 
Like in Experiment 1, there were no differences as a function of goal prime on 
performance, both F’s < 0.3, ns. 
Mood  
The item scores of the mood scale (α = .92) were averaged and subjected to a 
2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis revealed a marginally significant main 
effect of task F(1,66) = 3.66, p = .06, ηp2 = .05, suggesting that participants in the 
easy conditions were in a better mood than participants in the difficult conditions (M 
= 4.43, SD = 1.88 and M = 3.33, SD = 2.53, respectively). The two-way interaction of 
goal and task again failed to reach significance, F(1,66) = 0.54, ns. 
Self-esteem  
The item scores of the SSES (α = .85) were subjected to a 2 (goal: 
achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). The expected two-way interaction between goal and task 
emerged, F(1,66) = 7.77, p < .01, ηp2 = .11, see Table 1. Analyses of simple main 
effects showed that participants primed with an achievement goal reported higher self-
esteem after the easy scrabble task than after the difficult scrabble task, F(1,67) = 
7.86, p < .01, ηp2 = .11, whereas no such difference emerged for participants not 
primed with the goal to achieve, F(1,67) = 1.55, ns. 
Again, we analyzed the effects on self-esteem controlling for differences in 
mood. Scores of the self-esteem scale were subjected to a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no 
goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with mood as a covariate. The results showed that the effects on self-esteem were still 
significant after controlling for differences in mood, F(1,65) = 7.06, p = .01, η2 = .10.  
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The results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. 
Participants primed with an achievement goal reported higher self-esteem after an 
easy scrabble task than after a difficult scrabble task, whereas this difference was 
absent for participants not primed with an achievement goal. Whereas we used the 
same task as Chartrand (1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002) in this experiment, we again 
failed to replicate the interaction effect between goal and task on mood. Like in 
Experiment 1, we did not tell our participants that the data would not be collected. 
Therefore, our participants might have seen the task again as somewhat relevant or 
important, hence, instigating effects on mood irrespective of the goal one is pursuing. 
Experiment 3 
One problem of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 is that we did not show any 
differences in performance as a function of our goal-prime manipulation. To be able 
to show differences as a function of our goal-prime manipulation in Experiment 3 we 
used a different achievement task. Specifically we used a Dutch version of the remote 
associates test (Bongers, Dijksterhuis, & Spears, 2008) that was either very difficult or 
very easy. To disentangle the motivation to perform well and actual performance as a 
result of our task difficulty manipulation participants were given an opportunity to try 
multiple times in case of an incorrect answer. Therefore, the motivation to perform 
well is indicated by the time participants used to find the correct answer rather than 
the number of correct answers that is mainly influenced by the difficulty manipulation 
of the task. Furthermore, we changed the order in which mood and self-esteem were 
measured. Rather than measuring mood before self-esteem is measured, as we did in 
Experiment 1 and 2, we first measured self-esteem and subsequently mood in 
Experiment 3.  
Method 
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Participants and Design. 
Eighty-eight (24 men, 64 women) undergraduate students at the Radboud 
University in Nijmegen participated in the experiment, receiving either course credits 
or money (2 euro; approximately US$ 2.50) for their participation. They were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions in a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) 
x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between participants design.  
Procedure and Materials 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were allocated to separate cubicles. 
All instructions were provided by the computer. Participants started with the same 
scrambled sentences task (Srull & Wyer, 1980) as used in Experiment 1 to prime an 
achievement goal or not.  
Subsequently, participants were given the Dutch version of the remote 
associates test (Mednick, 1962; Bongers, Dijksterhuis, & Spears, 2008). Three words 
appeared on the screen and participants were asked to give a fourth word that was 
associated with all three words given. To manipulate the difficulty of the task 
participants were given 10 difficult associations or 10 easy associations (see, Bongers, 
Dijksterhuis, & Spears, 2008). To measure motivation to perform well participants 
were given the opportunity to try more often to find the correct solution. After each 
answer participants were given feedback on whether the answer was correct or not. If 
the answer was correct, participants received an announcement that their answer was 
correct and that the next association would appear on the screen. However, if the 
answer was not correct, participants received an announcement that their answer was 
incorrect. Furthermore, they were asked whether they would like to try again or 
whether they would prefer to continue with the next association. We did not expect 
any differences in the easy conditions, because participants will answer almost all 
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associations correctly the first time. However, we did expect a difference in the 
difficult conditions in the number of trials and the time used to guess the correct 
association. Therefore, we expect to find an interaction effect between goal and task 
on the number of trials and the time used to give the correct association.  
After the remote associates test we first measured self-esteem and 
subsequently mood. Self-esteem and mood were measured on 100-point scales. A line 
with two scale ends below the questions regarding mood and self-esteem were 
presented and participants were asked to click with the mouse on the line. They were 
told that the closer they clicked to the scale end, the more they agreed with that scale 
end. Then, participants were thoroughly debriefed. The funneled debriefing indicated 
that none of the participants was aware of the purpose of the experiment none of the 
participants noticed a particular pattern or theme to the words in the scrambled 
sentences task. 
Results 
Performance  
Participant’s total number of correct solutions in the remote associates test was 
subjected to a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between 
participants analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis demonstrated that 
participants in the easy conditions gave more correct solutions than participants in the 
difficult conditions, F(1,84) = 777.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .90 (M = 9.18, SD = 0.99 and M 
= 1.57, SD = 1.47, respectively). We did not find any effect of our goal prime 
manipulation on the number of correct solutions, both F’s < 1.  
To investigate whether participants in the difficult conditions were more 
motivated to perform well after being primed with an achievement goal, the number 
of trials, the total time they took, as well as the average time per trial participants used 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
 
were subjected to three separate 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. 
difficult) between participants analysis of variance (ANOVA). For all three we found 
a main effect of task difficulty, indicating that participants in the difficult conditions 
tried more often (F(1,84) =  59.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .41), spent more time per trial  
(F(1,84) =  47.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .36) and spent more time in total (F(1,84) = 91.41, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .52) than participants in the easy conditions, see Table 2.  
Although we did not find a main effect of goal or an interaction effect between 
task and goal (both F’s < 1) for the number of trials participants used, we did find 
effects of our goal prime manipulation for the time participants spend in total as well 
as the time they spent per trial. We found a marginally significant interaction between 
task and goal for the total time spent on the task, F(1,84) = 3.09, p = .08, ηp2 = .04. 
Analyses of simple main effects showed that in the difficult conditions participants 
primed with an achievement goal spent more time to find the correct solution than 
participants not primed with that goal, F(1,84) =  5.73, p < .05, ηp2 = .06, whereas in 
the easy conditions no such difference emerged F(1,84) =  0.04, ns. In addition, we 
found a marginally significant main effect of goal for average time per trial, F(1,84) =  
3.15, p = .08, ηp2 = .04, suggesting that participants who were primed with an 
achievement goal spent more time per trial than participants who were not primed 
with that goal. As predicted, we also found an interaction effect between task and 
goal, F(1,84) =  5.30, p < .05, ηp2 = .06. Analyses of simple main effects demonstrated 
that participants in the difficult conditions spend more time per trial to find the correct 
solution when primed with an achievement goal compared to when not primed with 
that goal, F(1,85) =  9.27, p < .01, ηp2 = .10, whereas in the easy conditions no such 
difference emerged F(1,85) =  0.09, ns. 
Self-esteem  
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The item scores of the SSES (α = .83) were subjected to a 2 (goal: 
achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). The analysis revealed a main effect of task, F(1,84) = 7.58, p < 
.01, ηp2 = .08, indicating that participants reported lower self-esteem after the difficult 
remote associates test than after the easy remote associates test, see Table 1. This 
main effect was qualified by the marginally significant two-way interaction between 
goal and task, F(1,84) = 3.54, p = .06, ηp2 = .04. Analyses of simple main effects 
showed that participants who were primed with an achievement goal reported lower 
self-esteem after the difficult remote associates test than after the easy remote 
associates test, F(1,85) = 12.27, p = .001, ηp2 = .13, whereas no difference emerged 
for participants who did not have activated an achievement goal, F(1,85) = 0.45, ns. 
Mood 
The item scores of the mood scale (α = .94) were averaged and subjected to a 
2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), revealing a significant main effect of task difficulty, 
F(1,84) = 5.93, p < .05, ηp2 = .07, indicating that participants who did the difficult 
remote associates test were in a worse mood than participants who did the easy 
remote associates test. Furthermore, the interaction between goal and task was 
marginally significant, F(1,84) = 3.19, p = .08, ηp2 = .04. Analyses of simple main 
effects revealed that participants who were primed with an achievement goal were in a 
worse mood after the difficult remote associates test than after the easy remote 
associates test (M = 58.10, SD = 14.68 and M = 72.50, SD = 18.20, respectively), 
F(1,85) = 10.11, p < .01, ηp2 = .11, whereas for participants who were not primed 
with an achievement goal task difficulty did not affect mood (M = 65.89, SD = 16.36 
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after the difficult remote associates test and M = 68.11, SD = 14.23 after the easy 
remote associates test), F(1,85) = 0.23, ns. 
In sum, when achievement motivation and actual performance are 
disentangled differences as a function of our goal prime manipulation appeared. When 
facing difficulties in a task, people who are primed with an achievement goal invest 
more time to find the correct solution than people who are not primed with the goal. 
Furthermore, we replicated findings of Experiment 1 and 2 showing that self-esteem 
is lower after goal-pursuit failure and higher after goal-pursuit success. Task-difficulty 
did not affect self-esteem of participants who did not have an achievement goal 
activated. Interestingly, when mood is measured after self-esteem consequences for 
mood are more pronounced after being primed with an achievement goal. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 was designed to investigate whether people whose self-esteem is 
threatened, after failing to attain an unconsciously activated achievement goal, would 
be motivated to protect self-esteem. Rather than measuring self-esteem after failing or 
succeeding, in this experiment we investigated whether people show a self-serving 
bias. We expected that failure would be attributed externally and success internally 
and that this effect would be more pronounced when a goal to achieve was activated 
unconsciously compared to when no goal was activated. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Seventy-four (18 men, 56 women) undergraduate students at the Radboud 
University in Nijmegen participated in the experiment, receiving either course credits 
or money (2 euro; approximately US$ 2.50) for their participation. They were 
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randomly assigned to one of the four conditions in a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) 
x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between participants design.  
Procedure and Materials 
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were allocated to separate cubicles 
and told that all instructions would be provided by the computer. Participants started 
with the lexical decision task as used in Experiment 2 to activate an achievement goal 
or not. Then they continued with the Raven test that was either difficult or easy, as 
used in Experiment 1. 
After participants completed the Raven test, we measured whether participants 
responded in a self-serving manner. In other words, we assessed whether they would 
attribute failure to external and unstable causes and success to internal and stable 
causes. To do so, participants were given four statements: “My performance on the 
task is a good indicator for how I generally perform these kinds of tasks” (stable); “It 
feels as if my performance on the task is caused by unforeseen circumstances” 
(external); “I had a prominent influence on my performance on the task” (internal); 
and “My performance on the task has nothing to do with my qualities to do these kind 
of tasks” (unstable). Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed 
with each statement on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 ‘totally not agree’ to 7 ‘totally 
agree’.  
Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed. The funneled debriefing 
indicated that none of the participants saw something unusual in the lexical decision 
task and none of the participants saw any flashes during that task.  
Results 
Performance 
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The number of correct answers on the Raven test were analyzed with a 2 (goal: 
achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between participants analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). The findings indicate that participants in the easy conditions 
gave more correct answers than participants in the difficult conditions, F(1,70) = 
210.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .75 (M = 7.59, SD = 1.85 and M = 2.00, SD = 1.45, 
respectively). Consistent with Experiment 1 no effects of our goal-prime manipulation 
emerged, both F’s < 2.3, ns. 
Self-serving bias 
The scores on the statements measuring stable and internal qualities were 
recoded and the self-serving bias was computed by averaging the scores of the four 
statements. These scores were subjected to a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 
(task: easy vs. difficult) between participants analysis of variance (ANOVA). Besides 
a main effect of task difficulty, F(1,70) = 34.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .33, a marginally 
significant interaction effect appeared, F(1,70) = 3.31, p < .08, ηp2 = .05. As can been 
seen in Table 3, these findings indicate that people who performed the difficult task 
attributed their performance more to unstable and external causes rather than to stable 
and internal causes, whereas people who performed the easy task attributed their 
performance more to stable and internal causes rather than to unstable and external 
causes. Importantly, this effect is more pronounced for people who had an activated 
achievement goal. 
Experiment 5 
In Experiment 4 it was shown that people who were not able to attain their 
unconsciously activated achievement goal were motivated to protect their self-esteem 
by attributing their failure to external and unstable causes. The aim of Experiment 5 
was to investigate whether such protection strategies indeed enhance self-esteem. In 
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order to do so, participants were again primed with the goal to achieve or not and 
were then given either the difficult or the easy version of the Raven test. 
After measuring mood and self-esteem, we investigated whether participants 
who failed to attain their achievement goal would be motivated to restore their self-
esteem by giving self-serving judgments of others’ performance. We asked all 
participants to judge a mediocre paper of a peer student. Participants were told that 
different professors often vary wildly in their assessments of similar papers and that 
the aim of the experiment was to investigate how students would judge such papers 
themselves.  
In line with the egocentric contrast effect (Beauregard & Dunning, 1998; 
Dunning & Cohen, 1992) we expected that participants who failed to attain their 
unconsciously activated achievement goal would judge the mediocre paper favorably, 
and hence, that they would give higher grades to the mediocre paper than participants 
who succeeded in attaining their unconsciously activated achievement goal. After all, 
people who just succeeded will use higher standards than people who just failed. For 
participants who just failed, using a low standard, (that is, awarding a higher grade to 
a mediocre paper) will make their own performance seem less poor. We did not (or at 
least to a lesser extent) expect such self-serving judgments for participants not primed 
with a goal. 
Finally, mood and self-esteem were again measured. We expected that 
participants who failed to attain their unconsciously activated achievement goal would 
report lower self-esteem immediately after the Raven test (from now, at “time 1”) 
than participants who succeeded in attaining that goal. Furthermore, we expected that 
after having judged the paper (from now on, at “time 2”) participants who failed 
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would show an increase in self-esteem. We did not expect these effects for 
participants who were not primed with the goal to achieve. 
Method 
Participants and Design. 
One-hundred-and-two (38 men, 64 women) undergraduate students at the 
University of Amsterdam were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions in a 2 
(goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between participants 
design. They received either course credits or money (4 euro; approximately US$ 5) 
for their participation.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants worked in separate cubicles and all instructions were provided by 
the computer. The procedure of Experiment 5 was identical to the procedure of 
Experiment 1, with two additions.  
Participants started with the scrambled sentences task in which they were 
primed with the goal to achieve or not. Subsequently, they were given either the easy 
or the difficult version of the Raven test. After that, mood and state self-esteem were 
administered. We wanted to prevent participants at time 2 from remembering their 
answers at time 1. Therefore, we measured mood and self-esteem on 100-point scales 
as we did in Experiment 3. After completing the SESS, participants were asked to 
judge a paper written by a peer student. In the cover story participants were told that it 
frequently happened that very similar papers were judged differently by professors 
and that this study was designed to investigate how students would judge those 
papers. Therefore, they were asked to give a grade between 1 and 10 according to the 
school system used in the Netherlands. They were allowed to give half grades (e.g., 
7.5) resulting in a 19-point scale ranging from 1 to 10. After judging the paper, mood 
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and state self-esteem were again measured on a 100-point scale, with only the line and 
two scale ends presented below the questions. 
Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed. The funneled debriefing 
indicated that none of the participants was aware of the purpose of the experiment and 
none of the participants noticed a particular pattern or theme to the words in the 
scrambled sentences task. However, five participants did not take the Raven test 
seriously (used less than 6 seconds per item). These participants were excluded from 
the analyses.  
Results 
Performance  
Participants’ total number of correct answer in the Raven test was subjected to 
a 2 (goal: achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis confirmed that participants in the easy 
conditions performed better than participants in the difficult conditions (M =7.57, SD 
= 2.39 and M = 2.27, SD = 1.76, respectively), F(1,93) = 152.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .62. 
As expected, and consistent with Experiment 1, 2 and 4, no effects of goal emerged, 
both F’s < 0.6, ns.  
Self-esteem protection  
To investigate whether participants were motivated to protect self-esteem, the 
grades they gave for the paper in the judgment task were subjected to a 2 (goal: 
achievement vs. no goal) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-participants analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Indeed, the two-way interaction between goal and task emerged, 
F(1,93) = 4.66, p < .05, ηp2 = .05, see Table 4. Simple main effects showed that the 
difference for participants who were primed with the goal to achieve was marginally 
significant between those who performed the easy Raven test and those who 
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performed the difficult Raven test, F(1,94) = 2.78, p < .10, ηp2 = .03. There was no 
difference for participants who were not primed with the goal to achieve, F(1,94) = 
1.80, ns. Furthermore, there was no difference for participants who performed the 
easy Raven test between those who were and those who were not primed with the goal 
to achieve, F(1,94) = 0.28, ns. However, for participants who performed the difficult 
Raven test, the difference between those who were and those who were not primed 
with the goal to achieve was significant, F(1,94) = 6.34, p < .05, ηp2 = .06.  
These findings indicate that participants who failed to attain their 
unconsciously activated goal gave higher grades than participants who succeeded to 
attain their goal, and than participants who performed the difficult Raven test but 
without having a goal. Indeed, participants who failed to attain their goal lowered the 
standards for others’ performance to make their own performance better. 
Mood  
To investigate the changes in mood the item scores of both mood scales (α = 
.93 at time 1 and α = .94 at time 2) were averaged and subjected to a repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Goal (achievement vs. no goal) and task 
(easy vs. difficult) were the between-participants variables, whereas time of 
measuring mood (time 1 vs. time 2) was the within variable.  
The test of within-participants revealed a two-way interaction between task 
and time, F(1,93) = 18.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .16, showing that at time 1 participants 
were in a worse mood after performing the difficult Raven test than after performing 
the easy Raven test, F(1,93) = 9.68, p < .05, ηp2 = .09, whereas this difference was 
absent at time 2, F(1,93) = 0.36, ns. The three-way interaction of task, goal and time 
failed to reach significance, F(1,93) = 0.93, ns. 
Self-esteem  
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To investigate the changes in self-esteem the item scores of the SSES (α = .86 
at time 1 and α = .88 at time 2) were averaged and subjected to a repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Goal (achievement vs. no goal) and task (easy vs. 
difficult) were the between-participants variables, whereas time of measuring self-
esteem (time 1 vs. time 2) was the within-participants variable.  
At time 1, the predicted two-way interaction between goal and task emerged, 
F(1,93) = 4.23 p < .05, ηp2 = .04. Analyses of simple main effects indicated that 
participants primed with the goal to achieve reported lower self-esteem after the 
difficult Raven test than after the easy Raven test, F(1,94) = 6.93, p = .01, ηp2 = .07, 
whereas no differences emerged for participants not primed with that goal F(1,94) = 
0.06, ns., see Table 5. As expected, we found no such differences at time 2, all F’s < 
1.4, ns. Furthermore, to investigate whether the increase in self-esteem was reliable 
for participants who failed to attain their unconsciously activated achievement goal, 
we conducted a paired t-test. This analysis showed that the increase in self-esteem 
was indeed significant, t(23) = 3.25, p < .005, d = .22. 
The test of within-participants revealed a two-way interaction between task 
and time, F(1,93) = 6.42, p < .05, ηp2 = .07, showing that at time 1 participants 
reported lower self-esteem after performing the difficult Raven test than after 
performing the easy Raven test (M = 61.54, SD = 11.55 and M = 65.45, SD = 12.34, 
respectively), whereas this difference was absent at time 2 (M = 64.76, SD = 11.81 
after the difficult test and M = 65.176, SD = 13.51 after the easy test). The three-way 
interaction of task, goal and time was marginally significant, F(1,93) = 3.24, p < .08, 
ηp2 = .03.  
In sum, participants who failed to attain their unconsciously activated 
achievement goal reported lower self-esteem after failure than participants who 
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succeeded to attain that goal, whereas no difference was found for participants who 
were not primed with the goal to achieve. Also, participants who failed to attain their 
unconsciously activated achievement goal were able to restore their self-esteem by 
giving a higher grade for the paper, resulting in enhanced self-esteem afterwards. Like 
Experiment 1 and 2, we did not replicate the interaction effect between goal and task 
on mood (Chartrand, 1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002). Again, we did not tell 
participants that the data would not be collected, nor did we measure self-esteem 
before measuring mood as we did in Experiment 3. 
Discussion 
Unconsciously activated goals, self-esteem and mood 
The current research showed that success and failure to attain unconsciously 
activated goals affect self-esteem. Goal pursuit failure results in lower self-esteem 
compared to goal pursuit success. Furthermore, people are motivated to protect their 
self-esteem when it is threatened after failing to attain an unconsciously activated 
goal. Experiment 1 showed that people who were primed with the goal to achieve 
reported lower self-esteem after doing a difficult Raven test than after doing an easy 
Raven test, indicating that goal pursuit failure lowered self-esteem and goal pursuit 
success enhanced self-esteem. These differences were not found for people who were 
not primed with the goal to achieve. Experiment 2 replicated the effects of 
Experiment 1 with a subliminal priming procedure and a different task manipulation.  
In Experiment 3 we replicated previous findings (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-
Chai, Barndollar & Trötschel, 2001) that people who were primed with an 
achievement goal were more motivated to perform well in a subsequent task 
compared to people who were not primed with that goal. In our experiment, this was 
especially the case when facing difficulties in the task.  
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Although previous findings (Chartrand, 2001) have demonstrated that mood 
was affected by task difficulty only after being primed with a goal, we found evidence 
for mood to be affected by task difficulty regardless of goal activation. We assume 
that performing well on almost any (somewhat relevant) task may lead to a positive 
feeling whereas performing poorly may lead to a negative feeling. However, when 
people are pursuing a goal to achieve, a good or a bad performance on an achievement 
task may be more applied to the self. Therefore, a good or a poor performance may 
affect self-esteem only when it is relevant for a current goal. This reasoning is 
supported by the analyses in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, indicating that the 
effects on self-esteem remained after controlling for differences in mood. 
Self-esteem protection 
In Experiment 4 and 5 we showed that people were motivated and able to 
protect self-esteem after failing to attain unconsciously activated goals. Experiment 4 
showed that participants attributed failure externally and success internally and that 
this effect was more pronounced when a goal to achieve was activated unconsciously. 
Furthermore, Experiment 5 demonstrated that participants who were primed with the 
goal to achieve reported lower self-esteem after a difficult Raven test than after an 
easy Raven test and they were able to enhance their self-esteem by judging a 
mediocre paper of a peer student rather favorably. Future research may further explore 
the use of self-protective mechanisms after failure to attain unconsciously activated 
goals. For example, one may investigate whether people are able to use self-
handicapping strategies (Jones & Berglas, 1978) or whether people are more likely to 
engage in stereotyping after failing to attain an unconsciously activated goal (Fein & 
Spencer, 1997).  
Implications and future research 
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In our experiments we measured self-esteem explicitly. It would be interesting 
to examine whether implicit self-esteem will be affected as well. Because goals were 
activated unconsciously, the effects on an implicit measure of self-esteem may even 
be stronger than the effects on an explicit measure of self-esteem. Another interesting 
idea is to measure implicit and explicit self-esteem before the experiment to 
distinguish people with secure high self-esteem from people with fragile high self-
esteem. People with high explicit self-esteem and high implicit self-esteem have 
secure high self-esteem, whereas people with high explicit self-esteem and low 
implicit self-esteem have fragile high self-esteem (Kernis, Abend, Goldman, Shrira, 
Paradise, & Hampton, 2005). Recent research has demonstrated that people with 
fragile high self-esteem are more prone to react defensively to negative feedback than 
people with secure high self-esteem (Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; 
Epstein & Morling, 1995; Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2002). This suggests that people 
with fragile high self-esteem will be more likely to protect their self-esteem after 
failing to attain an unconsciously activated goal than people with secure high self-
esteem.  
Future research may also explore whether goals differ in how threatening they 
are. In the current research we only used unconsciously activated achievement goals. 
However, failing to attain some goals might be more threatening than failing to attain 
others, and hence, they may instigate more defensive reactions.  
In many situations people pursue goals of which they are not aware. Success in 
attaining these goals will lead to higher self-esteem. However, as with consciously 
chosen goals, unconscious goal setting will not always lead to successful goal pursuit. 
Despite the fact that people can be unaware of their goal pursuits, failure to attain 
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such unconsciously goals will lead to lower self-esteem and to the use of self-
protective mechanisms. 
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Notes 
1. Item-difficulty was determined for each item by its location on the original 
Raven test. Items on the Raven test are arranged by difficulty, such that there is a 
progression from easiest items first to most difficult items last. For the easy condition 
the first ten items of the original Raven test were selected and for the difficult 
condition the last ten items. 
2. The scrabble task we used in Experiment 2 is comparable with the anagram 
task used by Chartrand (1999). However, we named it the “scrabble task”, since the 
task at hand resembles the well-known game.  
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